Conclusions of the research on Poland conducted in the framework of the project InAbsentiEAW

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1) Poland implemented FD 2009/299/JHA in 2011 by introducing to the Code of Criminal Procedure the new **optional ground for refusal** of the execution of the EAWs concerning judgments issued *in absentia*. This fact, together with strong support for the principle of mutual trust, has a great influence on the attitude of Polish judges acting as executing authorities with reference to EAWs concerning judgments issued *in absentia*. As transpires from the practice of the Polish courts examined in the framework of the project, during the last 5 years only in a few cases the execution of EAWs was refused by Polish courts due to the fact, that they concerned decisions issued *in absentia*. So, in general there is no problem of execution of such EAWs.

It should be underlined that the risk of violation of human rights constitutes a separate, mandatory ground for refusal of execution of the EAWs in Poland.

- 2) Poland does not have a long tradition of conducting a criminal trial *in absentia*. As from 1 July 2015 the CCP provides for the principle that participation of a defendant in the hearing is his/her right but not an obligation. Only exceptionally the trial cannot be conducted without the presence of the accused duly summoned to the hearing.
 - The notion "proceedings in absentia" s rather interpreted from the perspective of the national law and conceived as proceedings conducted despite the fact that a defendant is not aware of them. The Polish law provides for the opportunity of conducting such proceedings only in cases concerning fiscal offences (these are the special proceedings called "proceedings concerning absent suspects"). In case of presence of a defendant at some out of many dates of the hearing a defendant is always aware of the trial being conducted against him/her. Thus, the Polish issuing authorities seem to interpret the concepts used in section D of the EAW-form from the perspective of the national law.
- 3) On the other hand, Polish courts face some problems while acting as issuing judicial authorities, in particular in cooperation with these countries which introduced the mandatory ground for refusal of execution of EAWs concerning *in absentia* judgments.
 - As transpires from the examination of the case-files of the EAWs, the issuing authorities, while filling in part D of the EAW's Form, had some problems with classifying the situation of presence of the accused at some dates of the hearing and his/her absence at other dates of the hearing conducted at several dates. In particular, a bit misleading for Polish judges seems to be the notion of "trial resulting in the decision" used in Part D of the EAW form. Sometimes it is interpreted as "the hearing at which the judgment was pronounced", while under the

Polish law there is no obligation to be present at the date of the hearing at which the judgment is pronounced. Moreover, sometimes, presence at some of the hearings as to the merits (but not all) was classified by the Polish issuing authorities as personal presence of a defendant at the trial.

- 4) The Polish issuing authorities have some problems with filling in Part D of the EAW form with reference to cumulative judgments. Three different practices are applied regarding this issue. Usually part D is filled in only with reference to a cumulative judgment. This is a prevailing practice. Sometimes it is filled in with reference to all judgments ("single judgments" as well as a cumulative judgment). Finally, in some EAWs the issuing authorities filled in part D of the EAW form only with reference to a cumulative judgment but in section 4 of part D of the EAW form additional explanations were provided with reference to the proceedings in which the "single" judgments were rendered.
- 5) The Polish issuing authorities have some problems with classifying ways of serving of a summons in Poland while filling in Part D of the EAW form. This concerns the so-called substitute service of a summons. In some cases, it is classified as "personal service", in other as service by "other means" (3.1.b. of section D of the EAW form). The latter classification prevails. The problem with a summons served in this way is similar to that identified in *Dworzecki* case. It is difficult to assess whether "it was unequivocally established" that a defendant was aware of the scheduled trial. On the other hand, it should be stressed that after *Dworzecki* case, serving of a summons to the hands of an adult member of a defendant's household is not applicable anymore to a summons concerning the first date of the hearing.
- 6) While implementing FD 2009/299/JHA, Poland introduced into the Code of Criminal Procedure a new ground for re-opening of the criminal proceedings conducted *in absentia* (Article 540b of the CCP). However, as is stemming from the EAWs issued by the Polish courts, this ground for re-opening of criminal proceedings is not indicated in part D of the EAW form as an effective remedy available for a person after surrender. Thus, with a few exceptions, the box 3.4. of the EAW form is not ticked by the Polish issuing authorities. In my view this is because Article 540b offers only optional ground for re-opening of the proceedings. Moreover, under Article 540b § 2 of the CCP the substitute service of a summons, as described above, brings consequences equal to personal summoning (i.e. in principle, the motion for reopening of the proceedings is ineffective).

Recommendations:

 Re-opening of the proceedings under Article 540b of the CCP should be mandatory; the timelimit for the re-opening shall start from the service of the judgment issued in absentia.
Moreover, re-opening of the proceedings shall not be excluded in case of substitute service of the judgment issued in absentia.

- Judgments delivered *in absentia* shall be served upon a defendant if he/she is not represented by a defence counsel (this would result in an opportunity to mark box D 3.3. of the EAW form).
- In case of substitute service of summonses and presumption of summoning (Article 133 § 2 of the CCP) one cannot say that "it was unequivocally established that a defendant was aware of the scheduled trial" within the meaning of Article 4a (1)(a)(i) of the FD. For this reason, Polish courts should not treat this way of summoning as "summoning in person"; moreover, it is disputable whether this way of summoning may be classified as fulfilling the requirements of Part D 3.1.b. of the EAW form.